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Thank you. Thank you very much. 
Thank you to the Institute for Peace 
Science for inviting me, to Professor 
Kawano leading the Peace Science 
Institute,  and to Dr. van der Does as 
well, and thank you certainly to 
Hiroshima University for making me 
feel very welcome as a f irst visitor to 
your country. 
 
 
I  want to argue that across many 
parts of the world despite the apparent 
rage for memorialization and so called 
everywhere warfare we are actually 
losing the memory of  war. What I  want 
to argue is that we are losing the 
memory of  nuclear warfare. This 
forgetting of course has great 
consequences for how 21st century 
threats are perceived and responded to.  
To understand this,  I think we need to 
see that remembering and forgetting of  
warfare are not separate but are tightly 
bound through media. The 
entanglement of  media and memory, 
shape perceptions of the concept,  the 
character,  and the threat of  warfare. So 
we need to look at the interrelations 
between them, media, war, memory to 
be able to reveal what endures and what 
is forgotten and to what effects.  So, my 
main argument here today is that a  
consciousness of nuclear war has been 
displaced, has been forgotten. This 
displacement is made through two key 
ways. Firstly I  will  talk a bit more 
about this in a minute. We have heard 
Professor Hook talk about different 
levels or spaces or structures of  memory 
and the famous historian Jay Winter 
talks about different memory regimes. 
The new war imaginary: 
Why we are losing the 
memory of warfare
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Asian regime of memory is different to 
a Western regime of  memory. So, I  just 
want to talk a little  bit about the 
western regime of memory. That is 
because what you find in western 
mainstream media especially is a kind 
of persistence of a western heroic 
version of  war. A heroic version of  war. 
A war being legitimized through the 
repetition of  certain images that 
sanitize, will  glorify warfare and of  
course nuclear warfare is not a heroic 
version form of warfare. 
Secondly the other part of this 
argument is the rise of  the widespread 
perceived threat of  terrorism in 
information warfare has distracted 
attention from nuclear threats.  This is 
in a kind of  saturating environment of 
digital and social media in which it pays 
at least a chaotic abundance of  images 
of  warfare in the frontline. So before I 
set out this model of  forgetting war, it  
is important to say something about the 
relationship between technology, war, 
and perception. Critical to the memory 
and legitimacy of  warfare is that is 
experience for those engaged in combat 
and for those observing has long been 
shaped through distancing technologies.  
A very kind of famous philosopher 
called Paul Virilio ,  he talks about this 
logistics of  military perception.  
 
 
Here the history of  battle is 
primarily the history of  radically 
changing f ields of  perception. In other 
words war consistent not so much in 
scoring territorial,  economic or other 
material victories as a procreating 
vehicle of  the immateriality of  
perceptual f ields.  So, the point he is 
trying to make that really is war is a  
battle of  how things are seen and 
perceived and as we have already heard 
today, remembered. His memory is vital 
in how war is legitimized as in Professor 
Hooks’ presentation contested. And to  
return to what I  see as a great kind of 
paradox in how images of  war work 
today. What I  mean by that is in terms 
of  media and memory. There is a great 
scholar Ariella Azoulay and she argues 
that there are kind of  two contradictory 
assertions. 
Paul Virilio
‘the history of battle is primarily the history of 
radically changing fields of perception. In other 
words, war consists not so much in scoring 
territorial, economic or other material victories 
as in appropriating the ‘immateriality’ of 
perceptual fields’ (1989:7). 
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So, on the one hand there are no 
images while the other claim is that there 
are too many. Going to the first claim 
then there are too few images as nothing 
to look at. According to the second claim 
there are too many and it becomes 
impossible for us to look up war, to get a 
sense of what war is because we are 
overloaded by the saturating endless 
images of war. It might be in both of 
these cases too many too few images lead 
in to my argument about displacing 
nuclear war from western and above the 
global consciousness. I just want to make 
this example, just for a few minutes if 
you will allow me, just to draw on some 
images of dominant warfare that went 
through western culture and through a 
continuing American visualization of war 
through American mainstream media. 
The paradox for me is that despite there 
being billions and bill ions of images of 
war today through digital media, the 
mainstream media in the west is stuck 
on this idea of  a heroic vision of  war. 
And Michael Shaw looked at three 
separate western mainstream news 
organizations. And these three different 
news organizations sent their best 
photo journalists to Afghanistan. These 
three photo journalists from these 
separate news organizations all  came 
back with the same image, published in 
photo stories within a two-week period 
in January 2011. Now these pictures all  
depict wounded US marines in the rear 
of  a military helicopter coded 
MEDEVAC being air lifted out of  the 
Afghan war zone to safety. 
Subsequently,  Shaw found a number 
of  similar photographs published in 
2010, 2011 and 2012 across a range of  
mainstream media. In drawing attention 
to what he calls ‘redundancy, ’  Shaw 
makes clear that his intention is not to 
disrespect the photographers, the 
soldiers,  or the medevac missions and 
their saving of  l ives.  Instead, he argues, 
‘ this is a stunning display of  American 
chauvinism given the intimate framing 
of  the war in such a redundantly heroic 
narrative, all  eyes on our warriors as 
saviors on high. And then, what does it 
mean that such high-profile redundancy 
can occur with hardly a notice? ’ (Shaw, 
2011).  
That’s a really important point.  The 
ways in which mainstream media use 
the same images, the same frames of 
war, we become unaware of  because we 
Saturating or ignoring?
• Azoulay (2008: 191): 
• ‘two contradictory assertions – one claiming that there 
are no images, while the other claiming that there are 
too many – are generally voiced in succession by the 
same speakers’. 
• ‘According to the first claim, there are too few images, 
thus there is nothing to look at. According to the second 
claim, there are too many, and therefore it has become 
impossible to look’.
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have become accustomed to a very 
particular way that war was framed. 
The artist Simon Norfolk talks about 
this.  This kind of  photo journalism. He 
talks about is running down tramlines. 
So despite the millions and millions of  
images you could take in Afghanistan 
over the past – the decade-long 
contemporary war has been going on. 
There seems to be persisting 
expectation on you said it is in the west 
at least and photo journalists,  and news 
workers of  what a mainstream vision of  
warfare looks like. But the history here 
is not just recent,  OK? These follow a 
longer mainstream photo journalism 
trajectory in the west of  this image, 
which is embedded in early US wars. 
Simon Norfolk argues that this goes 
back to 1991. David C. Turnley’s this 
one won World Press Photo of  the Year. 
But this in turn is a kind of  reissued to 
reframing of  an even earlier image, 
Namely, Larry Burrows’  Vietnam 
photographics made the cover of  Life 
magazine in April  1965. It is a very 
famous photograph.  
So, the point I want to make here then 
is, there is a kind of strange divergence 
between, on the one hand, there is a kind 
of spontaneous, unfinished, and 
unsettled and mobile media. We think 
about social media and digital medias as 
chaotic and confusing and overloading 
with lots of millions and thousands of 
different perspectives of war. In that, 
surely, how we understand media today, 
but here the mainstream media seemed to 
perpetuate a single dominant frame of 
war. It ’s very contrived. But as I said in 
the beginning both of these cases I  am 
arguing kind of displace nuclear war 
from a kind of  western conscious-ness. 
What I  want to argue is that in the 
western memory regime if  you want to 
call  it  that,  the western memory regime 
has forgotten nuclear war three times. 
To show this I  want to show you a simple 
Google Books Ngram Viewer. A Google 
Books Ngram Viewer is an online search 
engine of books and researches. And why 
it’s useful is because it plots all the 
thousands and millions of words across all 
the books that have been digitalized on 
Google, okay. So, in terms if you look at 
the English language one over the kind of 
relevant period, if you search for the 
terms nuclear war and total war you get 
this. 
 
Now obviously total war and nuclear 
war have similar meanings, but as we 
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can see from this chart total war was 
more in use around the bombings of 
Japan. The term ‘nuclear war’  became 
more common in later years. What I  am 
saying this image shows you is three 
times forgotten. So f irstly of  course 
what I  am saying is the forgetting of  
total war after the bombing of  
Hiroshima and Nagasaki,  this idea of  
total war recedes very quickly. The 
second one, that of  course is after the 
1962 Cuban Missile  Crisis.  The term 
‘nuclear war’  disappears. This was after 
the Moscow-Washington hotline was set 
up to allow direct communication 
between the leaders of  the United 
States and the Russian federation. 
Thirdly, the really big decline on that 
chart after 1985. 
Of course, it  was the end of  the so-
called Second Cold War with rising 
tensions and rising investment in 
militaries by US and the Soviet Union 
during that period. So, this steep 
decline in the term ‘nuclear war’  and as 
you can see from the chart it continues 
to decline in the opening news of this 
century. So, what does that tell  you 
about consciousness of  nuclear war in 
the west? 
We can also see this similar trend in 
the use of  atomic war and the idea of  a 
Third World War because don’t forget 
it ’s about memory in the future. How we 
think about remembering the nuclear 
attacks on Japan in thinking about how 
we might prevent a third World War. If 
you look at the chart you can see a 
similar pattern. 
 
 
So, the idea that there would be a 
Th i rd  Wo r ld  War  se e m s  to  h av e  
s l ip p e d  o u t  o f  c o n sc io u sn e s s .  We  
d o n ’ t  be l i e v e  i t  w i l l  h ap p e n  an y m o re .  
We  d o n ’ t  be l i e v e  i t  w i l l  h ap p e n  
an y m o re .  Th e  u s ag e  o f  th e se  te rm s  in  
En g l i sh  l an g u ag e  bo o k s  f o r  m e  
in d i ca te s  th a t  th e re  i s  a  k in d  o f  f o rm  
o f  d an g e ro u s  f o rg e tt in g .  D an g e ro u s  
f o rg e t t in g  th a t  l e ad s  to  c o m p lace n cy .  
N am e ly ,  th e  r e m o v a l  o f  a  w id e sp re ad  
p e r ce p t i o n  o f  th e  t h re at  o f  n u c le ar  
w ar  ac tu a l ly  m a ke s  th at  w ar  m o re  
l ike ly .  Th e re  are  a  n u m be r  o f  
c o m m e n tato r s  w h o  m ake  th i s  
arg u m e n t .  Th e  f i r s t ,  th e se  qu o te s  
o f te n  201 5 .  Th i s  i s  t h e  Lu k an o v  w h o  
arg u e d  s in ce  th e  C o ld  Wa r  o r  th e  
m e ch an is m s  f o r  ta k in g  e ach  o th e r  
se r i o u s ly  an d  d i sp o s in g  m e an s  to  
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control damage. All those mechanisms 
were disrupted or eroded. 
Max Fischer, ‘That the world does not 
see the risk of  war hanging over it, ’  in 
other words, makes that risk all  the 
likelier.  For most Americans such 
predictions sounded probable, even silly, 
but the dangers are growing every week 
as are the warnings. Bruce G. Blair 
argues: there ’s a low nuclear threshold 
now that didn’t exist during the Cold 
War. When the principle challenges 
were identif ied in the memory of 
warfare and for looking what I  am 
trying to f ind here is a consciousness of  
a nuclear threat.  It ’s the idea that I 
mentioned earlier of  abundance, of 
overload, a kind of chaos of images in 
social media. It becomes diff icult to 
identify patterns of  what images people 
are posting and sharing. My question is 
how can we begin to make sense of  what 
remains and what is lost in the memory 
of  warfare online. 
 
I  don’t know how to answer this 
q u e s t i o n  w i t h  m e r e l y  h u m a n  m o d e s  
f o r  a n a l y s i s .  I t ’ s  s o  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
m a k e  s e n s e  o f  s o u r c e  a n d  s a m p l e  
a n d  a n a l y z e  m i l l i o n s  o f  s o c i a l  
m e d i a  i m a g e s .  S o ,  I  h a v e  b e e n  
c o l l a b o r a t i n g  w i t h  a  c o l l e a g u e ,  
A r i j u s  P l e s k a ,  w h o  i s  i n  C o m p u t i n g  
S c i e n c e  a t  G l a s g o w .  W e  h a v e  b e e n  
d e v e l o p i n g  a  s y s t e m  o f  m a c h i n e  
l e a r n i n g  s o f t w a r e  t o  l o o k  a t  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  i m a g e s  a n d  
d i f f e r e n t  w a r s .  F o r  t h i s  c o n f e r e n c e  
w e  j u s t  l o a d  t h e  i m a g e s  r e l a t e d  t o  
i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  n u c l e a r  w a r .  
I n f o r m a t i o n  w a r  i s  m u c h  m o r e  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  c l a s s i f y  t h a n  n u c l e a r  
w a r  i n  t e r m s  o f  i m a g e s .  B u t ,  h e r e ’ s  
a  c h a r t  o f  s o m e  r e l e v a n t  i m a g e s  
p o s t e d  o n  F a c e b o o k  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  
S o ,  t h i s  c h a r t  r e l a t e s  t o  a  k i n d  o f  
s a m p l e  o f  s e v e r a l  t h o u s a n d  i m a g e s  
p o s t e d  o n  F a c e b o o k  o v e r  t h a t  
p e r i o d .  
 
 
What we can see is a bump of  the 
images related to nuclear war after 
2012. Why was that I ask myself . Well, 
Dangerous forgetting
• Fyodor Lukyanov: ‘since the Cold War, all the mechanisms for 
taking  each other seriously and disposing means to control 
damage, all those mechanisms were disrupted or eroded’.
• Max Fisher: ‘That the world does not see the risk of war hanging 
over it, in other words, makes that risk all the likelier. For most 
Americans, such predictions sound improbable, even silly. But 
the dangers are growing every week, as are the warnings’.
• Bruce G. Blair: ‘There’s a low nuclear threshold now that didn’t 
exist during the Cold War’.
Thanks to Arijus Pleska (Glasgow) and image classifier database from http://www.image-net.org
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it is probably because President Putin 
was testing a number of nuclear 
missiles in October 2012. 
 
 
What this shows for me is that there 
is a kind of  viral archive of  war. Social 
media tracks events through sourcing 
an instant supply of  images being 
posted and shared and committed upon. 
This is part of  what I  refer to later as 
the third memory boom where the 
archive becomes part of  the event itself  
rather being something that is  
retrospectively curated. Amidst the 
apparent chaos of images on social 
media we can identify trends. In my work 
I am interested in how social media 
might challenge official archives of war 
as they feed on the present. These images 
are some of the ones that we pulled out 
when we looked for issues around nuclear 
war and World War III.  
This small sample of  a few thousand 
images associated with war and nuclear 
war that we just pulled out randomlly 
from Facebook have some things in 
common. 
 
 
Firstly,  they are perhaps and 
surprisingly mostly of twentieth century 
war, mostly being black and white but 
this again reinforces the idea of a 
threat of  a Third World War which they 
are attached to or total war, not 
something of  potentially in the future 
but somehow an idea from the past.  An 
idea that was lost with nuclear 
bombings. Secondly, and this is the 
contrast we get from the wonderful 
museum here is that war stands out 
with them is that there are 
predominantly images of  weapons of  
war including mushroom clouds. Not of 
people,  not of  people dead, not of people 
injured, not of  people burnt,  not of  the 
consequences of  war. So, this again 
seems to me a kind of  dominant 
imaginary of  warfare that sanitizes.  In 
recent years to help us think about how 
this might affect the future. Some cycle 
Thanks to Arijus Pleska (Glasgow) and image classifier database from http://www.image-net.org
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had developed models about how 
memory affects the future. 
 
 
A special issue of  the Journal of 
Memory Studies last year on memory 
and connection Conway and Loveday 
who are kind of  neuropsychologists 
argue that our individual memories 
shape what we consider to be plausible, 
what we think might happen in the 
f u tu re  an d  th e y  w r i te  o f  i t  
remembering imagining system.  
 
 
And at a social level in the same issue 
people argue that manipulating collective 
memory can shape the imaginings of the 
future and that’s why Professor Hooks’ 
paper was so important. He was 
demonstrating exactly how that was 
happening. Equally as the artist Shona 
Illingworth has argued: ‘Memory is very 
important to our capacity to imagine 
the future. If you suffer from amnesia it 
makes it very diff icult for you to not 
only inhabit your past but it becomes 
equally diff icult to imagine the future 
in any detail ’ .  
 
 
The principle challenge then is for 
the development of  a memory of  nuclear 
bombings of  past wars that enables a 
nuclear war to be imagined in usable 
terms, a useable past.  Apparently given 
the mix of amnesia and what I  am 
suggesting is the kind of  wrong type of  
remembering in western media of  total 
war as distant as history as sanitized. 
In the West at least,  we don’t have a 
very usable memory of  war. 
This work is part of  broader model I  
am developing of forgetting war. I just 
want to take the last 5 minutes just to 
go through this model.  As I  mentioned 
Shona Illingworth (2014):
‘Memory is very important to our capacity to 
imagine the future ... If you suffer from amnesia, 
it makes it very difficult for you to not only 
inhabit your past, [ ... ] but it becomes equally 
difficult to imagine the future in any detail’. 
─ 66 ─
IPSHU Research Report Series   No. 33 
 - 67 -
earlier today in the West we are going 
through and another part of  the world a 
third memory boom and Jay Winter the 
great historian identif ies two memory 
booms. The f irst generational memory 
boom is drawn from the 1890s to the 
1920s when memory was central to the 
formation of  national identities around 
memorializing the victims of the First 
World War and then the remembrance 
of  the Second World War fed into the 
second memory boom from the 1960s 
and the 70s. But of  course, as we know 
in many parts of  the world what 
followed the end of  World War Two was 
a kind of silence, a limited and mostly 
private recollection, denial, unspoken 
trauma, a non-memory. But once the 
kind of  memory boom had begun, these 
events were to become grit in some ways 
by unstoppable cycles of 
commemoration and memorialization. 
 
 
In the West at least but also in other 
parts of the world, the second memory 
boom was driven by developments in 
technology, the audiovisual recorder 
enabled a new documentation of  
survivor ’s testimonies. This was my 
point to the beginning how technology 
and memory and remembering are 
interlinked. The second memory boom 
accelerated at the end of  the 20th 
century in the 1990s with the rise of  
satellite television. It enabled 50th and 
60th anniversary memorial events to be 
televised live and across those 
countries involved in or affected by 
World War Two. But today we have 
what I  call  a third memory boom. This 
is the virility,  the contagion of  digital 
media which drives a haste,  a rage for 
memorialization. 
The politics of memory and emerging 
wars and other catastrophes are fought 
over even before these events have 
ended. The wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan for example are deeply 
contested and popular wars and these 
wars enter much more quickly into 
memorial spaces online, into museums 
by victims’ families,  by the military and 
by artist,  all  part when you are kind of 
critical of  media ecology of  memory. 
There’s no time to pause or reflect for 
their memory to settle. 
But at the same time there is an 
imbalance of  remembering and 
forgetting. Some wars and some 
catastrophes attract what is being 
called the memory industry while 
Forgetting War
• Third memory boom: rage for memorialisation
• Implosion of memory and history
• Western mainstream redundant vision of ‘heroic’ warfare
• Social media unsettling of recent wars in memory
• Overexposure and underexposure: too many and too few images
• What constitutes the archive of war? 
• Total/nuclear war forgotten three times
• Displaced by rise of threat of terrorism and information warfare
• Mistaken reading of everywhere media as ‘everywhere war’
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others fade away. Remembering is not 
always a good thing. Forgetting is not 
always bad. Memory in history seems to 
be blurred together. Digital 
technologies have shifted our registers 
of  time, decay, familiarity,  and 
permanence. The limits of  memory in 
history have been redefined. As I have 
said social media constitute a viral 
archive of  war. Traditional media have 
showed memory by placing visual 
templates of past,  events unfolding in 
the present to help render those events 
intelligible.  Social media as I  have 
shown doesn’t just offer 1 or 2 images to 
make sense in the present but 
thousands and millions, even though 
some become heavily shared and some 
just don’t. This raises the question of 
what counts as an archive of  war today?  
Just because there are millions of 
images online we mustn’t be confused to 
think that these are also accessible.  
How and by whom can these images be 
accessed in the future?  To what use can 
these images be put?  What kind of  
memories can be forged from social 
media or is it  the ultimate medium of 
forgetting. 
As I  mentioned earlier,  there is this 
contradiction between too many and too 
few images. For me in many ways social 
media unsettle war memory. I  have also 
talked about how our current Western 
mainstream perpetuates an idea of  
heroic warfare. You seem stuck on 
seeing current war through a particular 
heroic frame struggling to legitimize its 
21st century conflicts.  I  have also 
argued that nuclear war has been 
totally forgotten three times. I  have 
said that this is a dangerous form of 
forgetting. A kind of  failure if  you like. 
A failure of  memorialization to imagine 
the prospects of  a future World War. At 
the same time disproportionate 
perceptions of  terrorist threats obscure 
the very meaning of  warfare as it was 
traditionally conceived and remembered. 
Finally,  the perception of  a kind of 
continuous threat from terrorism and 
information war. Some kind of  any time 
every war is a case of  forgetting 
yourself.  Certainly in the West, we have 
forgotten what the 1950s were like. A 
decade when there were multiple wars 
and threats and uncertainties.  Looking 
back, we don’t see the world in the same 
way. We don’t see the multiple wars and 
conflicts going on in the 1950s. We tend 
to see history chronologically and we 
forget. 
To conclude, for me today what gives 
current warfare its complexity is a  
bottom-up feel that every militant or 
group on the ground inside Syria have 
their own Twitter or YouTube feed 
posting random material or feeding a 
continuous chaos of  digital war when 
everyone is a publisher, a commentator, 
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a journalist and the past is turned over 
in new ways in these circumstances of  
media f lux. The veracity of  events 
becomes more rather than less easy to 
discern or verify.  A kind of post truth or 
post trust media war. This is  kind of  
digitally mediated perception of  war 
that distracts and the greater threats,  
the bigger picture of the potential of  
nuclear war. Instead what is needed as 
I  have argued is the establishment of  a 
usable memory of  war, both locally and 
regionally and globally.  We will only be 
able to use the past through evading the 
distortions and forgetting of  time and 
media, unless we need to ask how we 
can keep a stable history in view, and I 
think the Institute for Peace Science is 
best placed to ensure that this happens. 
I  really do support and praise its vital 
work. Thank you. 
 
  
@andrewhoskins
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